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Abstract
This study develops a Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous entry of het-
erogeneous rms to analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth via a
cash-in-advance constraint on R&D investment. Our results can be summarized as
follows. In the special case of a zero entry cost, an increase in the nominal interest
rate decreases R&D, the arrival rate of innovations and economic growth as in previ-
ous studies. However, in the general case of a positive entry cost, an increase in the
nominal interest rate a¤ects the distribution of innovations that are implemented and
would have an inverted-U e¤ect on economic growth if the entry cost is su¢ ciently
large. We also calibrate the model to aggregate data of the US economy and nd
that the growth-maximizing ination rate is about 3%, which is consistent with recent
empirical estimates.
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1 Introduction
This study develops a Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous entry of heterogeneous
rms to analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth. The canonical Schum-
peterian growth model in seminal studies such as Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and
Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) features an identical step size of quality
improvements across rms. In this study, we consider a Schumpeterian model with random
quality improvements as in Minniti et al. (2013) but with the addition of a xed entry
cost to generate endogenous entry of rms with heterogeneous step sizes of quality improve-
ments. To incorporate money demand into this growth-theoretic framework, we impose a
cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint on R&D investment. Berentsen et al. (2012), Chu and
Cozzi (2014) and Chu et al. (2015) provide extensive discussion on evidence for the presence
of cash requirements on R&D expenditures.1 We capture these cash requirements using a
CIA constraint on R&D.
In this monetary growth-theoretic framework, we derive the following results. In the
special case of a zero entry cost, an increase in the nominal interest rate decreases R&D,
the arrival rate of innovations and economic growth as in previous studies, such as Chu and
Cozzi (2014) who consider a monetary Schumpeterian growth model with an identical step
size of quality improvements, because the distribution of innovations that are implemented
is exogenous under a zero entry cost despite random quality improvements. However, in the
general case of a positive entry cost, monetary policy a¤ects the distribution of innovations
that are implemented. Specically, an increase in the nominal interest rate decreases R&D
and the arrival rate of innovations, which increases the present value of future prots. The
resulting higher value of inventions leads to a lower threshold of quality improvements above
which an innovation is implemented generating a positive e¤ect on economic growth due
to more entries. Together with the negative e¤ect on the arrival rate of innovations, an
increase in the nominal interest rate would have an inverted-U e¤ect on economic growth if
the entry cost is su¢ ciently large. Because the Fisher equation gives rise to a positive long-
run relationship between the nominal interest rate and the ination rate that is supported
by empirical studies such as Mishkin (1992) and Booth and Ciner (2001), our result also
implies an inverted-U relationship between ination and economic growth. This theoretical
prediction on an inverted-U relationship between ination and economic growth is supported
by empirical studies such as Bick (2010) and López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011). Finally,
we calibrate the model to aggregate data of the US economy to provide a quantitative analysis
and nd that the growth-maximizing ination rate is 2.9%, which is close to the empirical
estimate in López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011) who identify a threshold ination rate of
2.7% for industrialized countries.
1For example, early empirical studies such as Hall (1992) and Opler et al. (1999) nd a positive and
signicant relationship between R&D and cash ows in US rms. More recently, Bates et al. (2009)
document that the average cash-to-assets ratio in US rms increased substantially from 1980 to 2006 and
argue that this is partly driven by their rising R&D expenditures. Brown and Petersen (2011) provide
evidence that rms smooth R&D expenditures by maintaining a bu¤er stock of liquidity in the form of cash
reserves. Falato and Sim (2014) use rm-level data in the US to show that rmscash holdings increase
(decrease) signicantly in response to a rise (cut) in R&D tax credits. These results suggest that due to
nancial frictions, rms need to use cash to nance their R&D investment.
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This study relates to the literature on innovation and economic growth. The R&D-
based growth model originates from Romer (1990), who develops a variety-expanding growth
model in which economic growth is driven by the development of new products. Then,
Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992)
develop the Schumpeterian quality-ladder growth model in which economic growth is driven
by the quality improvement of existing products. For simplicity, these studies assume an
identical step size for all quality improvements. A recent study by Minniti et al. (2013)
generalizes the Schumpeterian model by allowing for heterogeneous step sizes of quality
improvements that are randomly drawn from a distribution. Our study extends the elegant
framework of Minniti et al. (2013) by introducing a xed entry cost of implementing a
developed invention in order to generate endogenous entries of heterogeneous rms,2 which
turn out to have important implications on the e¤ects of monetary policy.
This study also relates to the literature on ination and innovation. In this literature,
Marquis and Re¤ett (1994) is the seminal study that analyzes the e¤ects of ination on
innovation in the Romer variety-expanding growth model. In contrast, we analyze the e¤ects
of ination in a Schumpeterian quality-ladder model as in Chu and Lai (2013), Chu and
Cozzi (2014), Chu et al. (2015) and He and Zou (2016), whose models however feature an
identical step size of quality improvements across rms. Subsequent studies, such as Chu
and Ji (2016) and Huang et al. (2015), consider monetary policy in a Schumpeterian growth
model with both variety expansion and (identical) quality accumulation across rms. As in
Marquis and Re¤ett (1994), these studies predict a monotonic relationship between ination
and economic growth.3 The present study contributes to this literature by allowing for the
endogenous entry of rms with heterogeneous step sizes of quality improvements, which
gives rise to a novel channel through which monetary policy a¤ects innovation and growth.
As a result, the model generates an inverted-U relationship between ination and economic
growth, which is supported by recent empirical studies.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and solves the model.
Section 3 analyzes the e¤ects of monetary policy. The nal section concludes.
2 A Schumpeterian model with heterogeneous rms
The Schumpeterian quality-ladder growth model is based on Grossman and Helpman (1991).
We extend their model by (a) introducing money demand via a CIA constraint on R&D to
analyze monetary policy, (b) considering lab-equipment innovation and entry processes that
use nal goods (instead of labor) as the input, (c) allowing for random quality improvements
as in Minniti et al. (2013), and (d) incorporating a xed entry cost to generate endogenous
entry of heterogeneous rms as in Melitz (2003). In summary, when a rm invents a higher
quality product, the step size of the quality increment is randomly drawn from a Pareto
2See also Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008), Haruyama and Zhao (2008) and Gustafsson and Segerstrom
(2010) who adapt this xed entry cost into the R&D-based growth model, but they do not consider random
increments on the quality ladder.
3The relationship between the two variables is usually found to be monotonically negative, but some of
these studies also nd that the relationship can be monotonically positive under some conditions.
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distribution. If and only if the quality increment is su¢ ciently large, then the rm would
pay the xed entry cost to implement the invention and enter the market.
2.1 Household
In the economy, there is a representative household which has the following lifetime utility
function:
U =
Z 1
0
e t ln ctdt, (1)
where the parameter  > 0 is the subjective discount rate and ct denotes consumption of
nal goods (numeraire) at time t. The household maximizes utility subject to an asset-
accumulation equation (expressed in real terms) given by
_at + _mt = rtat   tmt + itbt + wt +  t   ct. (2)
at is the real value of nancial assets (in the form of equity shares in monopolistic intermediate
goods rms) owned by the household. rt is the real interest rate. t is the ination rate. mt is
the real money balance accumulated by the household. bt is the amount of money borrowed
by R&D entrepreneurs subject to the following constraint: bt  mt. it is the interest rate on
money bt borrowed by R&D entrepreneurs, and it can be shown as a no-arbitrage condition
that it must be equal to the nominal interest rate such that it = rt + t from the Fisher
equation. To earn the wage rate wt, the household inelastically supplies one unit of labor.4
 t is a lump-sum transfer from the government to the household. From standard dynamic
optimization, the familiar Euler equation is
_ct
ct
= rt   . (3)
2.2 Final goods
Final goods are produced by perfectly competitive rms that employ labor and a composite
of intermediate goods as inputs. The production function of nal goods is Yt = LtK
1 
t ,
where Lt = 1 is labor input. Kt is a composite of intermediate goods produced with the
following Cobb-Douglas aggregator:
Kt = exp
(Z 1
0
ln
"X
j
qt(!; j)yt(!; j)
#
d!
)
, (4)
where the integer j in qt(!; j) denotes the quality vintage of intermediate goods !. Let j!
denotes the highest-quality vintage in industry !. Firms are indi¤erent between the highest-
quality vintage and the second-highest-quality vintage if their relative price is
pt(!; j!)
pt(!; j!   1) =
qt(!; j!)
qt(!; j!   1)  t(!), (5)
4Given that our model is already quite complex, we normalize the aggregate supply of labor to unity in
order to sidestep the issue of scale e¤ects; see for example, Peretto (1998, 2007) and Segerstrom (1998) for
important ways of removing the strong scale e¤ect in the Schumpeterian growth model.
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where t(!) > 1 is the quality increment between the two consecutive vintages of interme-
diate goods ! at time t. As usual, whenever this equality holds, we focus on the case in
which rms buy the highest-quality intermediate goods only. In equilibrium, only the highest
quality intermediate goods are traded. From prot maximization, the conditional demand
function for intermediate goods ! 2 [0; 1] is given by
yt(!; j!) =
(1  )Yt
pt(!; j!)
=
(1  )K1 t
pt(!; j!)
. (6)
Multiplying qt(!; j!) to both sides of (6) and then aggregating the natural log of the resulting
equation with respect to !, we derive
Kt = [(1  )Qt=Pt]1= , (7)
where Qt  exp
hR 1
0
ln qt(!; j!)d!
i
and Pt  exp
hR 1
0
ln pt(!; j!)d!
i
denote respectively the
aggregate quality index and the aggregate price index of intermediate goods.
2.3 Intermediate goods
There is a unit continuum of industries ! 2 [0; 1] producing di¤erentiated intermediate
goods. Each industry is temporarily dominated by a quality leader until the arrival and
implementation of the next higher-quality product. The owner of the new innovation becomes
the next quality leader.5 The current quality leader in industry ! uses one unit of nal goods
to produce one unit of intermediate goods yt(!; j!), so that the marginal cost of production
is one. From Bertrand competition,6 limit pricing yields the equilibrium price given by
pt(!; j!) = t(!). (8)
Therefore, the amount of monopolistic prot in industry ! is
t(!; j!) = [t(!)  1] yt(!; j!) =

t(!)  1
t(!)

(1  )Yt, (9)
where the second equality uses (6) and (8).
2.4 R&D
R&D is performed by a continuum of competitive entrepreneurs. If an R&D entrepreneur
employsRt(!) units of nal goods to engage in innovation in industry !, then she is successful
in inventing the next higher-quality product in the industry with an instantaneous probability
given by
t(!) = Rt(!)=t, (10)
5This is known as the Arrow replacement e¤ect; see Cozzi (2007) for a discussion of the Arrow e¤ect.
6See Denicolò and Zanchettin (2010) for an analysis of Cournot competition in the Schumpeterian model.
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where t  Q(1 )=t inversely measures R&D productivity and is proportional to Q(1 )=t
to ensure balanced growth. To facilitate the payment of Rt(!), the entrepreneur needs to
borrow cash from the household, and the cost of borrowing is determined by the nominal
interest rate it. Therefore, the cost of R&D is (1 + it)Rt(!). Let vet (!; j! + 1) denotes the
expected value of an innovation before the realization of its quality increment. Then, the
R&D free-entry condition is given by
vet (!; j! + 1)t(!) = (1 + it)Rt(!), vet (!; j! + 1)=t = (1 + it) . (11)
2.5 Random quality improvements
As in Minniti et al. (2013), when an R&D entrepreneur invents a higher-quality product in
industry !, the quality increment t(!) > 1 is drawn from a stationary Pareto distribution
with the following probability density function:
f() =
1

 
1+
 , (12)
where the parameter  2 (0; 1) determines the shape of the Pareto distribution. Given
that the expected value of t(!) is equal across industries, (9) implies that the expected
value of t(!; j!) is also the same across industries. Therefore, we will follow the standard
treatment in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which the arrival rate
of innovations is equal across industries,7 such that t(!) = t for ! 2 [0; 1].
2.6 Endogenous rm entry
To generate an endogenous distribution of heterogeneous rms, we follow Melitz (2003) and
others to consider a xed entry cost. The entry cost is given by t  Q(1 )=t ,8 which
is proportional to Q(1 )=t to ensure balanced growth. Given the entry cost, a rm enters
the market if and only if vt()  t, where vt () denotes the ex post value of an innovation
(i.e., after the realization of the quality increment ).9 vt () is monotonically increasing in 
because t() = (1 )Yt( 1)= is increasing in . Given that vt(1) = 0 and vt()=Q(1 )=t
is stationary in equilibrium, it can be shown that there exists a stationary threshold value
of ,10 denoted as ~, above which rms implement their innovations and enter the market
generating endogenous entry of rms with heterogeneous quality improvements.
7Cozzi et al. (2007) provide a theoretical justication for the symmetric equilibrium to be the unique
rational-expectation equilibrium in the Schumpeterian model.
8We do not impose a CIA constraint on entry for the following reasons. Unlike R&D investment that
is subject to uncertainty in innovation success, the entry cost is incurred after an innovation is already
developed and patented. Therefore, banks should be available to extend credits to the rm, which can use
the patent as a collateral.
9In a symmetric equilibrium with t(!) = t, the value of innovations does not depend on !.
10See Appendix A for the proof.
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2.7 Asset prices
The ex-ante value of an innovation (i.e., before the realization of ) is formally dened as
vet (!; j! + 1) =
Z ~
1
0  f()d+
Z 1
~
[vt()  t]f()d =
Z 1
~
vt()f()d  Pr(  ~)t,
where Pr(  ~) denotes the probability of the innovation being implementable. In the
symmetric equilibrium with vet (!; j! + 1)  vet , the no-arbitrage condition for the ex-ante
value of innovation can be derived as11
rt =
et + _v
e
t + Pr(  ~) _t   Pr(  ~)t
h
vet + Pr(  ~)t
i
vet + Pr(  ~)t
, (13)
where t is the arrival rate of innovation. Pr(  ~)t is the instantaneous probability that
an innovation is created and implemented in an industry. The Pareto probability density
function implies that
Pr(  ~) =
Z 1
~
f()d = ~
 1=
. (14)
Substituting (14) into (13) and rearranging terms yield
et
vet + ~
 1=
t
= rt + ~
 1=
t  
_vet +
~
 1= _t
vet + ~
 1=
t
, (15)
where the ex-ante value of monopolistic prots can be shown to be
et =
Z 1
~

  1


f()d

(1  )Yt =
"
~  1=(1 + )
~
1+

#
(1  )Yt. (16)
Similarly, the no-arbitrage condition for the ex-post value of an innovation with   ~ is
t()
vt()
= rt + ~
 1=
t  
_vt()
vt()
, (17)
where the ex-post value of monopolistic prots with   ~ is given by
t() =

  1


(1  )Yt. (18)
11See Appendix A for the proof.
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2.8 Monetary authority
The monetary policy instrument that we consider is the nominal interest rate it, which is
exogenously set by the monetary authority. Given it, the ination rate t is endogenously
determined according to the Fisher equation such that t = it   rt, where rt is the real
interest rate and determined from the Euler equation in (3). Then, the growth rate of the
nominal money supply is given by t = t + _mt=mt, which becomes  = i    on the
balanced growth path.12 Finally, the monetary authority returns the seigniorage revenue as
a lump-sum transfer  t = _mt + tmt to the household.
2.9 Dynamics
In this section, we characterize the dynamics of the model. Lemma 1 shows that given a
constant nominal interest rate i, the economy immediately jumps to a balanced growth path.
On this balanced growth path, each variable grows a constant (possibly zero) growth rate.
Lemma 1 The economy jumps to a unique and saddle-point stable balanced growth path.
Proof. See Appendix B.
2.10 Economic growth
Recall that the (log of) aggregate quality index is lnQt 
R 1
0
ln qt(!; j!)d!. In industry !; the
quality qt(!; j!) jumps to qt(!; j!+1) = (!)qt(!; j!) with probability Pr(  ~) = ~ 1=.
The continuum of industries shares this random process of quality improvements. Therefore,
the time derivative of lnQt is given by
_Qt
Qt
=
Z 1
0
[ln qt(!; j! + 1)  ln qt(!; j!)] d!

~
 1=
 =
Z 1
0
ln(!)d!

~
 1=
. (19)
Using the law of large numbers, we obtain13
_Qt
Qt
=
Z 1
~
(ln) ~f()d

~
 1=
 = (ln ~+ )~
 1=
, (20)
where ln ~+ captures the average step size of implemented quality improvements and ~f()
is dened as
~f()  f()R1
~
f()d
= ~
1
f().
12It is useful to note that in this model, it is the growth rate of the money supply that a¤ects the real
economy in the long run, and a one-time change in the level of money supply has no long-run e¤ect on
the real economy. This is the well-known distinction between the neutrality and superneutrality of money.
Empirical evidence generally favors neutrality and rejects superneutrality, consistent with our model; see
Fisher and Seater (1993) for a discussion on the neutrality and superneutrality of money.
13Derivations are available in an unpublished appendix; see Appendix C.
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Finally, the growth rate of output Yt and consumption ct is equal to
g =
1  

_Qt
Qt
=
1  

(ln ~+ )~
 1=
. (21)
Equation (21) shows that the equilibrium growth rate depends on two endogenous vari-
ables, the arrival rate  of innovations and the threshold step size ~. We can determine 
using the R&D condition vet = (1 + i)Q
(1 )=
t , where the balanced-growth value of v
e
t is
given by vet = 
e
t=( +
~
 1=
)   ~ 1=Q(1 )=t using (15) and the Euler equation. Then,
substituting (16) into the R&D condition, we obtain
(1  )
"
~  1=(1 + )
~
1+

#
Yt
Q
(1 )=
t
=
h
(1 + i) + ~
 1=

i
(+ ~
 1=
). (22)
In Appendix B, we show that the production function of nal goods can be expressed as
Yt =

1  
~e
(1 )=
Q
(1 )=
t . (23)
Similarly, we can determine ~ using the entry condition vt(~) = Q
(1 )=
t , where the
balanced-growth value of vt(~) is given by vt(~) = t(~)=( + ~
 1=
) using (17) and the
Euler equation. Then, substituting (18) into the entry condition, we obtain
(1  )
 
~  1
~
!
Yt
Q
(1 )=
t
= (+ ~
 1=
). (24)
Combining (22) and (24), we have the ~ condition given by
(~  1)~1= = 1
1 + i



1 + 
, (25)
where the left-hand side is monotonically increasing in ~. Therefore, (25) implicitly deter-
mines the unique equilibrium value of ~. Using (23)-(25), we obtain the  condition given
by
 =
~
 1=
(1 + i)

1 + 
(1  )1=
e(1 )=
  ~1=. (26)
Given the equilibrium value of ~ from (25), (26) determines the unique equilibrium value of
.
3 Monetary policy and economic growth
In this section, we explore the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth. In Section 3.1,
we analytically derive the e¤ects of the nominal interest rate. In Section 3.2, we calibrate
the model to quantify the relationship between ination and economic growth.
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3.1 Qualitative analysis
Here we rst derive the e¤ects of increasing the nominal interest rate i on the innovation-
arrival rate  and the threshold step size ~. Lemma 2 shows that  is decreasing in i for
a given ~. Lemma 3 shows that ~ is decreasing in i. The intuition can be explained as
follows. An increase in the nominal interest rate i increases the cost of R&D and reduces the
incentives for innovation; as a result, the innovation rate  decreases for a given ~. From the
balanced-growth version of (15), we have vet = 
e
t=(+
~
 1=
) ~ 1=Q(1 )=t , which shows
that the decrease in , by reducing creative destruction, increases the present value of the
prot stream generated by implementing an innovation. This induces the implementation of
innovations associated with smaller prot margins, thereby reducing the threshold mark-up
~ for entry.
Lemma 2 For a given ~, the innovation rate  is decreasing in the nominal interest rate i.
Proof. Use (26).
Lemma 3 The threshold step size ~ is decreasing in the nominal interest rate i.
Proof. Use (25).
When the entry cost t is zero, the nominal interest rate has no e¤ect on the distribution
of innovations that are implemented because all rms enter the market regardless of the size
of quality increments. In this case, ~ = 1, and g = 1 

 is monotonically decreasing in i via
. This result is the same as in Chu and Cozzi (2014), who consider a Schumpeterian growth
model with an identical step size of quality improvements across rms. However, when the
entry cost t is positive, the nominal interest rate i a¤ects both ~ and . In this case,
Pr(  ~) = ~ 1= is increasing in i. In other words, an increase in the nominal interest rate
reduces the threshold value ~ for entry and leads to more innovations being implemented for
a given . When the entry cost t is su¢ ciently large, the overall e¤ects of i on the composite
innovation rate ~
 1=
 and the equilibrium growth rate g = 1 

(ln ~+)~
 1=
 become non-
monotonic. Specically, we nd that when the nominal interest rate i increases, ~
 1=
 and
g rst increase and eventually decrease. We summarize these results in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 If the entry cost is su¢ ciently large (small), an increase in the nominal
interest rate has an inverted-U (negative) e¤ect on the composite innovation rate ~
 1=
 and
the equilibrium growth rate g
Proof. See the Appendix B.
Before we conclude this section, we explore the relationship between ination and eco-
nomic growth. The Fisher equation gives rise to a positive long-run relationship between
the ination rate and the nominal interest rate that is supported by empirical studies such
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as Mishkin (1992) and Booth and Ciner (2001). In our model, the ination rate is given by
the Fisher equation  = i r = i g(i) , where the second equality follows from the Euler
equation. Therefore, so long as @g(i)=@i < 1, we have @=@i = 1   @g(i)=@i > 0.14 Given
this positive relationship, ination and economic growth would also exhibit an inverted-
U relationship. Recent empirical studies such as Bick (2010) and López-Villavicencio and
Mignon (2011) provide evidence that supports an inverted-U relationship between ination
and economic growth.
3.2 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to aggregate data of the US economy to provide a
quantitative illustration on the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth. The model
features the following structural parameters f; ; ; ; g and policy variable i. For the
discount rate, we set  to a standard value of 0.05. For the labor share, we set  to a value
of 0.59; see Elsby et al. (2013) who document that the labor share in the US has fallen to
less than 0.60 recently. According to the Conference Board Total Economy Database, the
average growth rates of total factor productivity (TFP) in the US is about 0.6% from 1990 to
2014. We calibrate the R&D cost parameter  by targeting the scenario in which domestic
innovation drives half of the TFP growth in the US (i.e., g = 0:3%).15 For the cost of entry,
we calibrate  by setting the time between arrivals of innovation 1= to about 3 years as
in Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012). For the Pareto distribution parameter, we follow Minniti
et al. (2013) to consider  = 0:21 as our benchmark, but we also explore another value
 = 0:16 that has interesting implications. Finally, we calibrate the value of i by targeting
the average ination rate  in the US, which is about 2.5% in the past two decades. The
parameter and variable values are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Calibration
Targets r wL=Y g  
0.053 0.590 0.003 0.338 0.025
Parameters      i
0.210 0.050 0.590 0.0013 1.1249 0.078
0.160 0.050 0.590 0.0023 1.0951 0.078
Under our benchmark parameter values, we nd that economic growth is an inverted-U
function of the nominal interest rate. In Figures 1 and 2, we plot the equilibrium growth rate
g against the ination rate , which is monotonically increasing in the nominal interest rate
i. Figure 1 presents our benchmark result and shows that the relationship between economic
growth and ination follows an inverted-U shape. Furthermore, the growth-maximizing
ination rate is about 2.9%, which is close to the empirical estimate in López-Villavicencio
and Mignon (2011) who nd a threshold ination rate of 2.7% for industrialized countries.
14Under our calibrated parameter values, steady-state ination is indeed increasing in the nominal interest
rate.
15See Chu (2010) who nds that domestic R&D drives less than half of the TFP growth in the US.
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Figure 1: Ination and economic growth
( = 0:21)
In the empirical literature, studies sometime nd a monotonically negative e¤ect of in-
ation on economic growth; see for example, Guerrero (2006) and Vaona (2012). Indeed,
we nd that our model is exible enough to deliver a negative relationship between ination
and economic growth under reasonable parameter values. When we decrease the value of
 to 0.16 and recalibrate the rest of the parameters, we nd that the relationship between
economic growth and ination becomes monotonically negative. In this case, the smaller
value of  implies a smaller ratio of =, such that the negative e¤ect of ination dominates
the positive e¤ect.
Figure 2: Ination and economic growth
( = 0:16)
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4 Conclusion
In this study, we have developed a monetary Schumpeterian growth model with endoge-
nous entry of rms with heterogeneous quality improvements. Given this monetary growth-
theoretic framework, we explore the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth and nd
that ination could have an inverted-U e¤ect on economic growth. Furthermore, we cali-
brate the model to aggregate data of the US economy to provide a quantitative investigation.
Under our benchmark parameter values, we nd that the growth-maximizing ination rate
is about 2.9%, which is consistent with recent empirical estimates. However, given that we
have a stylized model, the quantitative analysis should be viewed as an illustrative exercise.
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Appendix A: The stationary quality threshold
In the symmetric equilibrium vet (!; j! + 1)  vet , the ex-ante value of an innovation is
given by
vet =
Z ~t
1
0  f()d+
Z 1
~t
[vt()  t]f()d =
Z 1
~t
vt()f()d  Pr(  ~t)t. (A1)
Substituting the ex-post no arbitrage condition condition rtvt () = t () + _vt () Pr( 
~t)tvt () into (A1) yields
rtv
e
t = 
e
t+
Z 1
~t
_vt()f()d Pr(  ~t)t
Z 1
~t
[vt()  t] f()d 
h
Pr(  ~t)t + rt
i
Pr(  ~t)t.
(A2)
Combining (A1) and the R&D condition (11) and also using (14), we obtainZ 1
~t
vt()f()d = (1 + it)t + ~
 1=
t t, (A3)
where it is chosen exogenously by the monetary authority. Di¤erentiating (A3) with respect
to t, we use the Leibniz integral rule to deriveZ 1
~t
_vt()f()d  vt(~t)f(~t)

~t = (1 + i) _t + ~
 1=
t
_t  
1

~
  1+

t

~tt. (A4)
We substitute (12) and the entry condition vt(~t) = t into (A4) to obtainZ 1
~t
_vt()f()d = (1 + i) _t + ~
 1=
t
_t: (A5)
Substituting (A5) into (A2), the ex-ante no-arbitrage condition for an innovation can be
expressed as
rt =
et +
h
_vet +
~
 1=
t
_t
i
  ~ 1=t t
h
vet +
~
 1=
t t
i
vet + ~
 1=
t t
, (A6)
which uses (14) and the R&D condition (11) again. Moreover, we make use of the R&D
condition (11), t = Q
(1 )=
t and t = Q
(1 )=
t to derive
_vet +
~
 1=
t
_t
vet + ~
 1=
t t
=

1  

 _Qt
Qt
.
With this expression, (A6) becomes
rt =
et
vet + ~
 1=
t t
+

1  

 _Qt
Qt
  ~ 1=t t. (A7)
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Meanwhile, the ex-post no-arbitrage condition for the threshold quality ( = ~t) can be
written as
rt =
t(~t)
vt(~t)
+

1  

 _Qt
Qt
  ~ 1=t t. (A8)
By the R&D condition (11), the entry condition vt(~t) = t, t = Q
(1 )=
t and t =
Q
(1 )=
t , (A7) and (A8) imply
et
(1 + i) + ~
 1=
t 
=
t(~t)

. (A9)
Given (16) and (18), (A9) can be rearranged as
(~t   1)~1=t =
1
(1 + i)



1 + 
. (A10)
Equation (A10) shows that ~t is always stationary.
17
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Using (8), we can express the aggregate price index of intermediate
goods as16
Pt = exp
Z 1
0
lnt(!)d!

= exp
Z 1
~
(ln) ~f()d

= ~e, (B1)
where ~f() is dened as
~f()  f()R1
~
f()d
= ~
1
f(). (B2)
Here we introduce a modied density function ~f() in summing  on [~;1] because the
distribution of  in equilibrium is not on the original domain [1;1), but instead on [~;1),
due to endogenous entry. Note that
R1
~
~f()d = 1. By (7) and (B1), we obtain Kt =h
(1  )Qt=(~e)
i1=
. Incorporating this condition into the production function Yt = LtK
1 
t ,
we obtain
Yt =

(1  )Qt
~e
(1 )=
, (B3)
noting Lt = 1. Recall that nal goods are used for consumption, production of intermediate
goods, R&D and entry. Consumption is given by ct. By (6) and (8), the amount of nal
goods used for the production of intermediate goods is
Xmt =
Z 1
0
yt(!; j!)d! =
Z 1
0
(1  )Yt
t(!)
d! = (1  )Yt
Z 1
~
1

~f()d =
(1  )Yt
(1 + ) ~
. (B4)
Final goods for innovation and entry are given by
Xrt =
Z 1
0
Rt(!)d! = tt and X
e
t =
Z
!2
t
td! = t~
 1=
t, (B5)
where 
t is the set of industries in which innovations take place and are implemented at
date t. Finally, we substitute (B3), (B4) and (B5) into the market-clearing condition Yt =
ct +X
m
t +X
r
t +X
e
t to derive
t =
1
 + ~
 1=
"
1  
~e
(1 )= 
1  1  
(1 + ) ~

  Ct
#
, (B6)
where Ct  ct=Q(1 )=t is a transformed variable that is stationary. We substitute (16) and
the R&D condition (11) into (A7) to derive
rt =
(1  )Yt
(1 + i)t + ~
 1=
t
"
~  1=(1 + )
~
1+

#
  ~ 1=t +
1  

_Qt
Qt
. (B7)
16We achieve this by applying integration by parts toZ 1
~
(ln) ~f()d =
~
1=

Z 1
~
(ln)
 
d
d
1 
1+

1  1+
!
d:
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Finally, substituting (B3) and (B7) into (3) yields
_Ct
Ct
= rt    1  

_Qt
Qt
=
(1  )1=
[(1 + i) + ~
 1=
]e(1 )=
"
~  1=(1 + )
~
(1=)+(1=)
#
  ~ 1=t  , (B8)
noting the denitions Ct  ct=Q(1 )=t and t  Q(1 )=t . Substituting (B6) into (B8), we
have an one-dimensional di¤erential equation in Ct.17 Given that t decreases with Ct in
(B6), the right-hand side of (B8) is increasing in Ct, so the dynamics of Ct is characterized
by saddle-point stability, such that Ct must jump to its interior steady-state value. Given a
stationary value of Ct, (B6) implies that t is also stationary.
Proof of Proposition 1. In this proof, we rst show that the relationship between i and
~
 1=
 is either inverted U-shaped or negative. Combining (25) and (26), we have
~
 1=
 =
(1  )1=
e(1 )=
 
~  1
~
1=
!
  : (B9)
By di¤erentiating the right-hand side of (B9) with respect to ~; we can easily show that
d(~
 1=
)=d~ > (<) 0 if ~ < (>) 1=(1   ), implying an inverted-U relationship between
~ and ~
 1=
: In identifying the relationship with respect to i; we naturally focus on a
non-trivial range of ~; i.e., (; ); where ~
 1=
 > 0 holds.18 Given that ~ monotonically
decreases with i (Lemma 3), i  0 provides another natural upper bound of ~, say i; which
is dened by
(i   1)1=i =



1 + 
: (B10)
When i is large enough (exceeding 1=(1   )), the relationship between i and ~ 1= is
inverted U-shaped on the non-trivial range (; i); see Figure 3a. When i is small enough
(falling below 1=(1   )), ~ 1= is monotonically decreasing in i on (; i); see Figure 3b.
Note that, by (B10), i increases with  and, by (B9),  decreases with : This implies that
for a larger (smaller) entry cost , accompanied by a larger (smaller) i; the relationship
between i and ~
 1=
 becomes inverted-U (negative).
17Although e is an endogenous variable, it is stationary and a function of parameters as shown in (A10).
18The formal denition of (; ) is given by incorporating ~
 1=
 = 0 into (B9):  and  are equal to x
such that (x  1) =x1= = e(1 )==(1  )1=: This has the two solutions such as x =  and  if and only
if  <  (1  ) 2  =e(1 )=: Otherwise, ~ 1= cannot be positive.
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In the rest of this proof, we characterize the relationship between i and g. For ~ <
1=(1  ); it holds d(~ 1=)=d~ > 0 as shown above. Given that (ln ~+) is also increasing
in ~; this implies dg=d~ > 0 for ~ < 1=(1   ); by noting (21). To see the case where
1=(1  ) < ~; using (21) and (B9), we can obtain
dg
d~
=
1  
~
1+1=
8>>><>>>:

(1  )1=
e(1 )=

~  1

  ~1=

| {z }
(~): unimodal and concave in ~
  (ln ~+ )(1  )
1=
e(1 )=
1  


~  1
1  

| {z }
(~): increasing and convex in ~
9>>>=>>>; :
Note the following properties: (a) (1=(1   )) > 0 and (1=(1   )) = 0; (b) (~) is an
uni-modal function19 and (~) is a strictly increasing function; (c) () = () = 0; and (d)
(~) is strictly concave and (~) is strictly convex.
Using these properties, we can graphically show that (~) intersects (~) from below only
once at some point in ~ 2 (1=(1  ); ), below (above) which dg=d~ > (<) 0. This implies
an inverted-U relation between ~ and g on (; ). The rest of Proposition 1 straightforwardly
follows, noting that i is increasing in .
19It is useful to note that (~) is upward sloping at ~ = 1=(1  ).
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Appendix C (not for publication)
Equation (20): Recall that the equilibrium distribution of  is given by ~f(); which is
dened by (B2) in Appendix B. Then we calculateZ 1
0
(ln(!)) d! =
Z 1
~
(ln) ~f()d =
~
1=

Z 1
~
(ln) 
1+
 d,
where the second equality uses (12) and (B2). Given that
 
1+
 =
d
d
1 
1+

1  1+

,
we have Z 1
0
(ln(!)) d! =
~
1=

Z 1
~
(ln)
"
d
d
 
1 
1+

1  1+

!#
d.
Applying integration by parts, we calculate
~
1=

Z 1
~
(ln)
"
d
d
 
1 
1+

1  1+

!#
d =
~
1=

( 1 
1+

1  1+

ln

1
~
 
Z 1
~
 
1+

1  1+

d
)
:
From  1 
1+

1  1+

ln

1
~
= ~
  1
 ln ~ and
Z 1
~
 
1+

1  1+

d =  2~ 
1
 ;
we have
R 1
0
(ln(!)) d! = ln ~+ .
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